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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with fully distributed reputation-based mechanisms 
that improve security in MANETS. We introduce a number of optimisations to 
the current reputation schemes used in MANETs such as selective deviation 
tests and adaptive expiration timer that aim to deal with congestion and quick 
convergence. We use two different centrality measures for evaluation of the 
individual trust claims and resolving the aggregated ones. We design and build 
our prototype over AODV and test it in the NS-2 in the presence of variable 
black hole attacks in highly mobile and sparse networks. Our results show that 
we achieve  increased throughput while delay and jitter decrease and converge 
to AODV. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a proliferation of interest in ad hoc network 
security that due to potentially high mobility of nodes and lack of 
common infrastructure render conventional security solutions 
dysfunctional due to their dependence on centralized authority. A 
wide range of fully distributed reputation-based security 
protocols for ad hoc networks have been proposed but usually 
tested in relatively low mobility or even semi static scenarios (i.e. 
long pause time between node movement and slow node speed 
[3][4][18]).  
This paper is concerned with the design, implementation and 
evaluation of a reputation-based self organized protocol that is 
specifically targeted for highly mobile and sparse environments. 
Our protocol follows distributed reputation guidelines given in 
[1] and considers two types of Centralities to improve on the 
reputation convergence and faster isolation of malicious nodes. 
We incorporate our protocol within AODV and perform 
extensive simulations a number of scenarios characterized by 
high node mobility (speed 20 m/s), short pause time (1 second) 
and highly sparse network in order to evaluate each of the design 
choices of our system. We focus on a single and multiple black 
hole attacks [2] but our design principles and results are 
applicable to a wider range of attacks such as gray hole attacks. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives 
brief review of the related work. Section 3 describes our 
proposed protocol. Section 4 gives our results and Section 5 
concludes and identifies future work.  
II. RELATED WORK 
 Distributed reputation has been used in both MANETs 
and P2P environments. CORE [6] proposed a watchdog for 
monitoring and isolating selfish nodes based on a subjective, 
indirect and functional reputation. CONFIDENT [7] proposed 
using an adaptive Bayesian reputation and trust system where 
nodes monitor their neighbourhood and detect several kinds of 
misbehaviour. SCAN [4] proposed a network layer security 
protocol that relies on collaborative localised voting to convict 
malicious nodes and using asymmetric cryptography to protect 
the token of normal nodes. In the peer-to-Peer file-sharing 
networks, reputation has been used to reflect the ratings of 
different users and distributed Eigen-Vector has been proposed to 
calculate trust in a distributed Peer-to-Peer environment. Ref. [8], 
proposed EigenTrust algorithm that assigned each peer a unique 
global trust value, based on the peer’s history of uploads. 
EigenTrust used 1 or -1 to represent user’s satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction about the download transaction respectively. In 
our model, node’s reputation is classified to not only good or bad 
but we classify nodes into multiple zone that enable higher 
details and better decision making depending on the required 
services such as packet forward or Topology discovery as 
described below. Other researches attempted to provide routing 
layer solutions to black hole attacks, with techniques to identify 
and isolate these nodes as in [9][10]. [9] proposed that a node 
communicates with one extra node while [10] considered static 
sensor networks which are not similar to MANET conditions. 
Ref. [11] proposed a solution to collaborative black hole attack 
using next hop information validation but showed no results or 
detailed analysis. 
III. OUR REPUTATION-BASED FULLY DISTRIBUTED 
PROTOCOL FOR HIGHLY MOBILE AND SPARSE 
MANETS 
A Functional Overview  
Our reputation based protocol integrates four main features of 
distributed reputation systems proposed in [1] and shows how 
they can be extended by utilising different kinds of centrality of 
nodes even in highly mobile and disconnection-prone scenarios.  
Each node in a MANET collects reputation information, through 
direct observation of its neighbours (subjective observation) and 
gathers indirect (second hand) reputations from other nods. In 
addition to using historical observations, our protocol uses 
reputation discounting to ensure that old reputations will fade 
away giving more chance for nodes to reclaim their reputation by 
consistently behaving in a cooperative manner. We use 
secondary response to retaliate against any neighbour who 
originally had a bad reputation that then got reclaimed, if this 
neighbour shows early signs of misbehaver afterwards, to avoid 
reputation discounting firing-back. We employ reputation noise 
detection and cancellation, deviation test and secondary response 
that are specifically tailored for our highly challenged 
environment in order to increase the accuracy and reliability of 
the reputation resolution 
We consider two kinds of Centrality: Eigen vector and degree 
centrality in order to elect the most influential nodes to assist in 
the role of helping other nodes to build their trust into other less 
popular nodes in the network and act as community leaders.. 
Nodes with higher centrality have higher probability of getting in 
contact with many other nodes than nodes with low centrality. 
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We identify the nodes that have both high centrality and high 
reputation as preferred sources for indirect reputation. This 
becomes even more important in high-mobility and sparse 
networks, as nodes often have few connections –if any- at any 
point in time, these connections are frequently changing which 
causes more uncertainty. We argue that nodes with higher 
centrality and higher reputation are prime nodes to give highly 
trusted opinions about other nodes in MANET in a self-organized 
manner. We use centrality of ego networks for each node to 
obtain localized view of its neighbourhood to allow fast 
reputation convergence and subsequently higher throughput 
Figure 1 shows an example of how we use Eigen-Vector 
reputation-based centrality to influence nodes decision about the 
reputation of other nodes and the importance of indirect-
reputation exchanged between nodes. Both centrality of the 
reporting nodes and indirect-reputation are key to quick isolation 
of the malicious nodes and convergence of reputation across all 
the nodes.  
 
Figure 1: Eigen-Vector Reputation-Based Centrality. 
In Fig. 1, node A is the observed node and each of its 
neighbours has a direct reputation measure for it as R1 to R4 
respectively. Node B, that is not directly connected to node A, 
receives R1-R4 reputation observations about Node A. By 
applying the Eigen-Vector reputation-based centrality, as 
discussed in section B below, node B will have a centrality 
measure based on all Node A’s neighbouring nodes reputation 
evaluation of that node. Using this technique makes Node B 
immune against an attack where one node would collude with 
multiple other nodes to provide false indirect reputation about 
node A, as indirect reputation reported by N1-N4 is subject to 
selective deviation test that is described in the section B. 
When we resolve node’s reputation as a function of its 
centrality characteristics, we classify it as high, medium or low 
centrality. 
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Figure 2: Self-Organized node selection for indirect-reputation information. 
Fig. 2 shows how we classify the observed nodes into zones 
based on their reputation and centrality. Nodes falling into zone 1 
are highly trusted nodes that also have wider view of the 
network. Nodes that are classified as belonging to that zone have 
privileges such as higher watchdog expiration time and they are 
exempted from the deviation tests on their reported indirect-
reputation, low or no discounting factor, and high Reputation-
Record expiration time. On the other hand, nodes falling into 
zone 6 are classified as miss-behaving nodes, so their reported 
indirect-reputation is rejected. Nodes falling in zones between 1 
and 6 would have different levels of acceptance and the different 
parameters would be adjusted to reflect their current zone. Nodes 
classification can change over time. This can be a result of a 
good reputation node that started to behave maliciously and 
hence become less trusted and fall to a less favourable zone. This 
technique allows the network to evolve into a multiple clusters of 
different trustworthiness levels. These different levels of trust-
worthiness allow higher layer applications to limit their 
interaction only to one selected zone vs. any other zone. 
B Architectural Overview 
Fig. 3 shows the interaction between the key components of 
our reputation model in order to provide automatic and 
autonomous routing decisions to the under-laying routing 
protocol based on the available neighbours’ reputations.  
 
Figure 3: Reputation system model. 
Reputation Management is the main entity responsible for storing 
and retrieving all the node’s neighbours’ reputation records. It 
orchestrates the operations of the other components and act as the 
concentration point for all the events taking place inside the 
system. Neighbour Reputation Record is the entity representing 
reputation observation for one of the neighbours. Each node 
holds N neighbour reputation records where N can be determined 
by the node’s memory capacity, CPU power for maintenance to 
update these records and other resource constraints. Nodes with 
higher reputation and centrality should hold enough reputation 
records about other nodes in order to provide adequate coverage 
of the nodes in its own area. Node recycles these records using 
expiration time to balance the different overheads with the need 
to have enough reputation about different neighbours.  
Reputation Broadcast is the entity responsible for receiving 
indirect reputation from neighbours. It performs a selective 
deviation test to ensure the unity of view with the receiving node 
point of view. Traditional Deviation Test as presented in [1], 
requires each node to compare received indirect reputation with 
its own direct reputation for a given neighbour and reject any 
indirect reputation that deviate by a certain value ∆ (the deviation 
threshold). In our Selective Deviation Test, the receiving node (a) 
attempts to calculate the reputation of its neighbour node (j). 
Node (a) first checks the reputation of the indirect reputation 
information source node (i). Rai is the reputation held by node (a) 
about node (i). If the reputation Rai > (threshold) then Rij is 
trusted without further tests. This enables fast reputation 
convergence which is critical in our challenged scenarios where 
  
nodes don’t get enough time to observe the reputation of other 
nodes. At the same time, node (a) uncertainty with respect to 
node (j) decreases as a result of trusted node (i). We follow the 
same definition of uncertainty as used by Feng et al. in [14].  
Reputation Detect, Filter, Transform and Localize: The calculation of the 
direct reputations was inspired by the Eigen Trust algorithm 
presented in [8]. Our algorithm calculates a global consistent 
reputation value at each node for all its neighbours and then 
resolves the reputation using direct and indirect (second hand) 
reputation information. Each node calculates the Eigenvector 
centrality of its neighbours in order to reflect on each neighbour 
reputation and the level of confidence in this neighbour reported 
indirect reputation. xi denote the score of the i
th node. Let Ai,j be 
the adjacency matrix of the network. Ai,j is originally defined in 
Eigen-Vector Centrality as Ai,j = 1 if the i
th node is adjacent to the 
jth node, and Ai,j = 0 otherwise. In our model, Ai,j = s, where s is 
the wireless signal strength from the ith node to its neighbour jth 
node, and Ai,j = 0 if the i and j are not neighbours. For the i
th node 
(the observed node), the centrality score is proportional to the 
sum of the scores of all nodes which are connected to it. Hence: 
 
Where M(i) is the set of nodes that are connected to the ith 
node, N is the total number of nodes and λ is a constant. For the 
purpose of our reputation schema we use connectivity instead of 
transaction. This connectivity takes place when the node either 
receives or requests a forward of a message from that neighbour. 
In our distributed network environment, each node marks its 
experience when it comes into contact (i.e. becomes connected) 
with another neighbour. Periodically, each node will evaluate its 
connectivity experience with each of its direct neighbours and 
gives it a rating and vice versa. Node i calculate the percentage of 
packets originating from i that were forwarded by node j over the 
total number of packets offered to node j, frwd(i,j), and the 
percentage of packets that were expired (i.e. packets that were 
originating or forwarded by node i to node j but they were not 
subsequently forwarded by node j) over the total number of 
packets offered to node j, expr(i,j). 
Sij = frwd(i,j) – expr(i,j) 
Where Sij is the recent satisfaction index for node i about node 
j. Sij would be then weighted into the direct reputation of node j:  
Rij  = Rij-prev  * Whistory + Sij  * (1-Whistory). 
If no connectivity between i and j takes place, Rij is discounted 
instead. We define max
 t to be the maximum observation of Rij 
over time. Rij is normalized as: 
Rij  = Rij / max t ( R ij )  
Variable/Adaptive Observation Expiration Time is the time 
that a node waits for its direct neighbour to perform the requested 
function before a watchdog times-out and penalize that neighbour 
for its failure (i.e. forward the packet). Nodes are able to monitor 
their neighbours’ behaviour by utilizing the shared nature of the 
wireless medium and constantly overhearing its neighbours’ 
traffic. We propose a per neighbour/adaptive expiration 
technique that allows a node to adjust depending on its 
neighbour reputation and network conditions. For trusted 
neighbours, the observation expiration time would be higher than 
for non-trusted neighbours. Network or Node Congestion, if 
detected by an observing node, it would increase its expiration 
time accordingly. This would decrease the number of false 
positive and enable the protocol to selectively adjustable in 
responses to different network conditions.  
Resolver is responsible for doing the actual calculation of the 
neighbour final reputation (called resolved reputation) by 
combining direct and indirect reputation and performing 
Reputation Noise Cancellation. As packets might get dropped 
accidently by nodes due to other network conditions such as 
congestion, interference which doesn’t constitute malicious 
behaviour, we have included an adaptive threshold measure that 
is adjusted depending on the neighbour node movement profile 
and the link quality between the observing node and its 
neighbours. Depending on the node own knowledge about the 
medium quality reported by the node’s physical layer, the node is 
able to adjust the threshold of acceptable silent error level from 
that neighbour. If the node experiences a packet loss from its 
neighbour below this threshold, it considers that loss as a noise 
and subsequently ignores the lost packets. If the losses were 
above the noise threshold level, the node will start reacting to 
these events accordingly.  
Route Maintenance is being called when the Resolver detect that 
a certain neighbour reputation has fallen below a certain 
threshold. The “Route Maintenance” entity is responsible for 
breaking all the routes going through this neighbour and initiates 
a new replacement route search as needed. In our implementation 
using AODV, the “Route Maintenance” entity sets the route to a 
special mode called “Local Route Repair” as described in [16]. 
This special route mode would enable queuing packets going out 
on the route until an alternative route is established if possible, 
else all the packet queued are dropped and a route error (RERR) 
message is sent to the neighbour nodes. 
Different components of our proposed model rely on a number 
of observed parameters that affect neighbour specific or node 
wide parameters in a complete state-machine for each node as 
shown in Fig 4 below.  
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Figure 4: Reputation system parameters. 
IV. EARLY PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTAION 
AND RESULTS 
We have performed a number of experiments in highly mobile 
and disconnected topologies where network experienced frequent 
neighbourhood changes and lower route stability. We have 
integrated our reputation-based protocol with AODV. Our 
simulation scenarios included 20 mobile ad-hoc nodes randomly 
  
moving in 750m X 750m area where the simulation time was 500 
second and the mobile node wireless range was 250m, our nodes’ 
speed was 20 m/s, and pause time was 1 sec that is significantly 
very short pause time compared to 300 sec in [17]. The 
percentage of black hole nodes that we used is much higher than 
in other test scenarios found in [17] were the scenarios used up to 
a maximum of 20% black hole nodes. 
 
Figure 5: (a) Average Throughput, (b) Average Delay, and (c) Average Jitter with various number of 
black hole nodes. 
Fig. 5 (a), shows that the network throughput for our 
reputation-based protocol gracefully falls as the number of 
malicious nodes increase but it remains bounded above 70% 
(benchmark is AODV throughput without black hole attack). At 
the same time, AODV with a black hole is continuing to drop 
below 50%. Fig. 5 (b), shows that while the average data packet 
delay (Delay = arrival time – send time, Averaged over all the 
data packets sent during the scenario) is high in AODV with 
reputation compared to AODV with no reputation, it does 
converge to AODV as the number of malicious nodes approach 
15%. This can be attributed to the speed by which the malicious 
nodes are identified and isolated as their number increase due to 
the higher probability that they will come across normal node, 
this helps to quickly resolve the reputation of malicious nodes 
and decrease uncertainty as explained in [14]. As the number of 
malicious nodes increase above 20%, the Average delay becomes 
lower than AODV without reputation. Fig. 5 (c), shows the 
average data packet Jitter comparison between AODV and 
AODV with Reputation. It shows that AODVRB has 
considerably higher Jitter when the percentage of the black hole 
nodes is below 15% compared to AODV without reputation. This 
can be explained as the node has higher probability of meeting 
new nodes with no prior reputation; the node will be reluctant to 
switch to any of these new neighbours even though they might 
have been able to offer shorter paths with less delay and jitter. As 
the number of black hole nodes approach 20% of the total 
number of nodes, AODVRB does converge fast to AODV. This 
can be attributed to the fact that the network was able to quickly 
identify and isolate malicious nodes as the black hole nodes have 
higher probability of meeting good nodes. And the probability of 
meeting new unknown node decreases. Fig. 5 (d), shows the 
distribution of reputation and centrality of normal and malicious 
node.  Our observations show that higher centrality normal nodes 
advance in their reputation faster than lower centrality normal 
nodes. At the same time, lower centrality malicious nodes are 
slower to isolate than other malicious nodes that have higher 
centrality. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Our proposed reputation framework relies on centrality and 
mobility as two key parameters to drive the system to a more 
stable state in highly mobile, sparse and disconnected 
environments. We discuss how we integrate two kinds of 
centrality in our reputation-based protocol and propose a number 
of optimisations for more efficient node monitoring and trust 
resolution such as selective deviation test and adaptive expiration 
timer. Our early prototype implementation over AODV confirms 
and extends the results published in [3][4][5]. The results 
presented in this paper show that the throughput remains above 
70% in the presence of the increasing number of blackhole nodes 
while the jitter and delay decrease and are below AODV. We 
also discuss the impact the distribution of centrality and 
reputation of our nodes has on the time needed to isolate 
malicious nodes.   
Our subsequent work will focus on studying the impact of 
centrality and configuration parameters on the protocol 
performance in relation to network throughput, network delay, 
network jitter and the protocol detection ratio. We will 
investigate the response of the reputation protocol under the same 
high-mobility conditions and subject to collaborative black hole 
and gray hole attacks.  
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